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ATTITUDES, INCENTIVES, AND TAX COMPLIANCE 
Abstract: 
Our study examines whether combining experimental economics and economics psychology 
techniques can provide a better understanding of individuals’ tax compliance decisions in the 
laboratory. We find that considering individuals’ attitudinal, personality and intention measures 
in addition to economic based variables provides a richer understanding of individuals’ actual tax 
compliance decisions in the laboratory in the face of monetary incentives. We also find that 
hypothetical and actual compliance decisions in the laboratory are significantly different from 
each other. Specifically, we find that actual (hypothetical) compliance decisions are significantly 
influenced by their moral reasoning (anti-establishment) views. Finally, we find that individuals’ 
actual compliance decisions in the laboratory correlate more significantly with their admission of 
prior evasion than either their hypothetical compliance decisions or their responses to case 
scenarios. The latter result, coupled with the lack of appropriate field data on tax compliance, 
indicates that actual compliance decisions in the laboratory in the face of monetary incentives 
and with the use of tax terms in the instructions may be an ideal method of obtaining data on 
individuals’ tax compliance. 
JEL Classification:  H27  
Key Words:  Attitudes, Intentions, Tax Compliance, Tax Evasion, Experimental Economics, 
Moral Development.  
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ATTITUDES, INCENTIVES, AND TAX COMPLIANCE 
1. Introduction 
Tax evasion is a serious problem in the United States and in Canada. The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that it loses roughly $100 billion each year due to tax evasion 
(Slemrod and Bakija, 2000). At the same time many empirical studies have noted that levels of 
tax compliance are far higher than a simple risk-return model would predict (e.g., Graetz and 
Wilde, 1985; Skinner and Slemrod, 1985; Alm et al., 1992). A proper understanding of why 
people pay or do not pay taxes is important not only from an academic perspective but also for 
devising proper policy measures to maintain and improve compliance. 
Obtaining a good understanding of tax evasion and factors affecting it using field data is 
very difficult, if not impossible. Tax evasion by definition is a concealed activity. Therefore, 
researchers have used alternate sources of data to examine the tax evasion question. One 
alternate source of data on tax evasion is the controlled laboratory experiment. Laboratory 
studies on tax evasion have broadly adopted either an economic approach or a psychology-based 
approach. Specifically, psychology-based studies typically use tax language, and try to examine 
the relationship between individuals’ personal characteristics, attitudes, intentions and tax 
evasion behavior. These studies have contributed immensely to our understanding of factors 
affecting and associated with tax compliance decisions. However, tax evasion behavior captured 
in these studies is often hypothetical behavior, or reactions to case situations, and not behavior 
that has real economic consequences to the decision makers. Thus, it remains unclear to what 
extent the evasion captured by these studies is representative of people’s actual tax evasion 
decisions in real life, which may have very large and significant economic consequences to the  
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taxpayers. In contrast, studies using the methodology of experimental economics adopt an 
economic approach to understand tax evasion. Tax compliance decisions in these studies have 
real economic consequences to the decision makers. Furthermore, experimental economic studies 
on tax evasion, following accepted convention, refrain from using context-specific language in 
the instructions to the participants. This is consistent with the focus of these studies on people’s 
reactions to incentives, rather than the context of the incentives. Consequently, no attempt is 
made in these studies to relate participants’ tax evasion decisions to their personality related 
variables, attitudes and intentions. Thus, a rich set of potential determinants of tax evasion are 
left unexamined by these studies. 
The present study attempts to draw from both economics as well as psychology while 
examining participants’ tax compliance decisions in the laboratory. We make use of an 
experimental economics framework to ensure that participants’ compliance behavior has real 
economic consequences to them. At the same we also make use of tax specific language in the 
instructions to our participants. In fact, participants were urged to act in a manner similar to the 
way in which they would act if placed in a similar taxpaying situation in real life. The last two 
features of our experimental design allow us to examine the relationship between individuals’ tax 
compliance decisions in the laboratory that have economic consequence to them and their actual 
tax compliance decisions in real life, both conditioned by their attitudes, intentions, and 
personality characteristics. We also attempt to contrast participants’ actual compliance decisions 
with their hypothetical decisions and their reactions to case situations – the traditional methods 
of obtaining data in psychology-based studies. 
We make use of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) of Ajzen (1991) to guide our 
choice of attitudes, intentions and the relationship of these categories of variables to compliance  
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decisions. TPB is a successor to the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) of Fishbein and Ajzen 
(1975), Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and Ajzen (1988). Our study is not a test of TPB. Previous 
studies that have tested TRA and TPB in a tax compliance context have done so either using case 
or hypothetical situations and thus have not examined whether attitudes and intentions influence 
behavior in the face of actual monetary considerations in an experimental economics framework 
(Hanno and Vilotte, 1996; Blanthorne (2000); Bobek and Hatfield, 2003). 
Our study makes several significant contributions. We find that hypothetical and actual 
compliance decisions in the laboratory are not identical. In fact, estimated mean compliance 
obtained using statistical models in our study indicate that hypothetical compliance is 
significantly lower (higher) than actual compliance in the laboratory at the zero (twenty five) 
percent audit rate. Further, the determinants of both measures of compliance in the laboratory, 
hypothetical and actual, are not the same. Thus, our results indicate that hypothetical measures of 
compliance though probably cheaper and quicker to obtain may not be appropriate surrogates for 
actual compliance. Specifically, our results suggest that findings based on changes in 
hypothetical compliance consequent to changes in policy variables many not be reliable 
indicators of individuals’ actual reactions to such policy changes. The latter conclusion is 
especially valid given that actual compliance in the laboratory as opposed to other measures of 
compliance, including hypothetical compliance decisions in the laboratory, correlates the most 
with individuals’ admission of past evasion. In summary, actual compliance in the laboratory 
appears to be the best measure of individuals’ compliance decisions in real life. 
Our results indicate that individuals’ personal characteristics like moral reasoning, and 
attitudinal variables and intentions are by far the most significant predictors of their actual 
compliance decisions in the laboratory. These findings suggest that using experimental  
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economics techniques along with the use of tax terminology in the instructions to the participants 
and the inclusion of individuals’ intentions and attitudinal variables can lead to a richer 
explanation of individuals’ tax compliance decisions.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. We provide a brief literature review in 
Section 2; in Section 3 we describe the research method. We present the data analysis and results 
from our study in Section 4. Finally, the contributions and limitations of this paper and 
suggestions for future research are summarized in Section 5. 
2. Brief Literature Review 
Traditionally, economic studies on tax compliance have adopted a risk-return approach, 
where only those variables having clear economic consequences to individuals are taken into 
consideration. Only recently have some studies made attempts to identify reasons for tax 
compliance that go beyond the risk of discovery and punishment. For example, Alm et al. (1992) 
focus on the possibility that people sometimes overestimate the probability of being audited and 
punished. Other experimental studies examine the role played by social norms. For example, 
Alm et al. (1995) find higher compliance levels in the United States than in Spain, and stronger 
reactions to changes in economic parameters in Spain than in the US. They attribute these results 
to differences in social norms between the two countries. Alm et al. (1993), Alm et al. (1999) 
and Feld and Tyran (2002) all show that allowing participants to vote on various aspects of the 
laboratory tax regime can significantly affect laboratory social norms and hence the level of tax 
compliance.
1 However even in all the above studies there still is no explicit attempt to link 
individuals’ attitudes, personality related variables or intentions to their tax compliance 
decisions. These studies are still very much in the economic mould.  
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Theory of Planned Behavior 
Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior is well suited to understand how individuals’ 
attitudes, personality variables and intentions influence their tax compliance decisions. Ajzen’s 
(1991) theory of planned behavior models behavior as depending on behavioral intention, and 
behavioral intention in turn as depending on three factors: (1) attitude toward the behavior; (2) 
subjective norms; and (3) perceived behavioral control. In addition, perceived behavioral control 
is modeled as capable of influencing behavior directly as well. Thus, behavioral intention is a 
mediating variable between individual attitudes, norms, and perception of control on one hand 
and behavior on the other. Ajzen (1991) notes that the TPB is open to the inclusion of additional 
predictor variables if they improve the prediction of intention or behavior after the original 
variables have been taken into account. In the tax compliance context, moral reasoning appears 
to be a natural choice as an additional predictor, not only influencing intentions, but also 
behavior directly, since tax compliance has strong moral implications. Figure 1 illustrates the 
theoretical relationships posited by the TPB augmented with the inclusion of ethics or moral 
reasoning as it applies to tax compliance. A brief description of each of the constructs in the TPB 
is provided further below. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The TPB states that attitudes are based on an individual’s underlying behavioral beliefs. 
An individual will find a particular behavior to be relatively more attractive to the extent that the 
person believes that such behavior will lead to a highly valued outcome. Subjective norms are a 
function of an individual's perceived expectation that one or more relevant referents such as a 
significant other or family would approve of a particular behavior and the extent to which the  
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individual will be motivated to comply with such a referent’s beliefs (Ajzen 1991). The TPB 
perception of behavioral control refers to an individual’s perception regarding the extent of 
control he or she has to perform a particular behavior. Perceived behavioral control is linked to 
behavior both directly as well as indirectly through intentions (Figure 1). The indirect link 
represents the motivational influence of control on behavior. To the extent people believe that 
they have limited control over performing a particular behavior, their intention to perform the 
behavior may be decreased. The direct link from perceived behavioral control to behavior 
represents the actual control an individual has over behavioral performance. 
Hanno and Violette (1996), test the Theory of Reasoned Action, the predecessor of the 
Theory of Planned Behavior in a tax compliance context. In contrast, Blanthorne (2000) and 
Bobek and Hatfield (2003), test the Theory of Planned Behavior in a tax compliance context. All 
three studies use the psychology paradigm of conducting experiments in that none provides 
monetary incentives directly tied to participants’ behavior. 
Moral Reasoning and Anti-establishment Views 
The present study uses the Defining Issues Test (DIT) to investigate the impact of moral 
reasoning and anti-establishment views on tax compliance.  The DIT is grounded in the theory of 
the stages of moral reasoning first proposed by Piaget (1965) and later formalized by Kohlberg 
(1969). Rest (1979) developed the DIT to assess participants’ moral reasoning in terms of the 
Kohlberg model, and its reliability has been tested in hundreds of research studies (Rest et al., 
1986, 28-58). The most commonly used measure from the DIT is the P score which represents 
the extent of post-conventional level of moral development attained by each individual (Rest et 
al., 1986, 185-200).  
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  In this study we have also included the A Score calculated in the DIT for each 
participant. The A Score represents the degree to which the participant exhibits an “anti-
establishment orientation, a point of view which condemns location and existing social order for 
its arbitrariness or its corruption by the rich for exploitation of the poor…  [It is] possibly a 
transition phase between conventional morality and principled morality.” [Rest, 1987, p. 4.2]. If 
we assume the government and its tax authorities as the “establishment” then intuitively the A 
Score may have some relationship to tax compliance, albeit a negative one which may mitigate 
the effect of the individual’s overall moral reasoning. We expect participants’ level of moral 
reasoning as well as anti-establishment views as measured by the P Score and A Score 
respectively to influence their tax compliance behavior. 
3. Research  Method 
  We conducted our research at a medium-sized Canadian university using undergraduate 
as well as MBA student participants. We held a three-hour session to (i) obtain demographic 
data, (ii) to administer the instruments necessary to assess the participants’ moral reasoning and 
(iii) to conduct the experiment. Participants’ earnings were structured in such a manner as to 
assure them of average earnings of $15.00 per hour. To maintain their anonymity and to reduce 
demand effects, participants were identified only by unique identification numbers. Participants 
were further assured of the confidentiality of the study through a cover letter, which promised 
that only the principal researchers would have access to their data.  
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Data Collection 
Expectancy-value Depiction of Attitudes, Social Norms, and Perceived Behavioral Control 
We adopt Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) expectancy-value framework to collect data on 
individuals’ attitudes, social norms and perceived behavioral control. Thus, participants were 
asked two questions concerning each of the indicators of attitudes, social norms and perceived 
behavioral control. First, they were asked how much they valued each of the beliefs (i.e. how 
important the item or person was to their tax reporting decision). Subsequently, they were asked 
to rate the expectancy (of encouraging / discouraging underreporting) of each belief. Both were 
measured on a seven-point Likert scale from -3 to +3 including zero. The indicators represent the 
product of these two measures. Data on a total of 23 indicators were obtained in the above 
fashion. These indicators have been pretested and used previously in Hanno and Violette (1996) 
and/or Blanthorne (2000). Through factor analysis and adopting a cut-off of one for eigen values 
we identified six factors or components. 20 of the 23 indicators above load on to these six 
principal factors or components (see Table 1 and Appendix A for a complete list and for related 
results respectively).
2 Further reliability analysis (not presented) using Corbanch’s Alpha, which 
is based on the average inter-item correlation, indicated that this grouping of the 20 indicators 
across the six components to be reasonable. The six components have been labeled Subjective 
Norms (six indicators load on this factor), Duties of a Citizen (five indicators load on this factor), 
Advantage of the System (four indicators load on this factor), Monetary Considerations (two 
indicators load on this factor), Penalties (two indicators load on this factor), and Third Party 
Reporting (a single indicator loads on this factor). While the lone factor Subjective Norms relates 
to the construct of subjective norms in the TPB, the factors Duties of a Citizen, Advantage of the 
System and Monetary Considerations relate to the construct of attitudes. Likewise, the factors  
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Penalties and Third Party Reporting relate to perceived behavioral control. Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics on these different attitudinal measures in addition to intentions, personality 
variables, and compliance. 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
Intentions 
Following Hanno and Violette (1996) we elicited five measures of intention to comply. 
Four of these relate to intention to report income while the last relates to intention to overstate 
expenses. The four measures of intent to report income as well as the lone measure of intent to 
overstate deductions were elicited using a Likert-type scale ranging from -3 to +3, with -3 
labeled unlikely and +3 labeled likely that they would report their income or overstate 
deductions. Since the first four measures load on to a single factor they were combined into a 
single variable and named Intent to Report Income. The last one, being a lone measure, was 
retained in its original unmodified form and was labeled Intent to Overstate Deductions. In 
summary, therefore, we use two measures of intention – Intent to Report Income, and Intent to 
Overstate Deductions.  
Behavior 
We used a within-subjects design to elicit two measures of actual compliance in the face 
of monetary incentives using experimental economics techniques. At the same time we also 
explicitly asked our participants to behave identically to what their compliance behavior would 
be if placed in real-world tax compliance contexts with similar economic consequences. The 
within subjects variable was the audit rate, which was set at zero percent for the first five rounds 
and 25 percent for the next five rounds. The average compliance over the five rounds under each  
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treatment was used as the measure of actual compliance at the zero percent (Average Actual 
Compliance at the Zero Percent Audit Level) and 25 percent audit rate (Average Actual 
Compliance at the 25 Percent Audit Level) respectively. There were two between-subjects’ 
variables, Group -- undergraduate or graduate students, and Income -- 5,000 Lira or 9000 Lira. 
Participants provided with 5,000 Lira had to pay taxes at 10 percent, while participants at the 
9,000 Lira level had to pay taxes at 50 percent. Therefore, at full compliance the after-tax income 
for both levels of income would be the same, 4,500 Lira. As a consequence however, we cannot 
distinguish between income or tax rate effects. 
To compare our measures of compliance with traditional measures of compliance used in 
previous behaviorally oriented studies we also elicited two measures of hypothetical compliance, 
and responses to four case scenarios. The two measures of hypothetical compliance were 
obtained assuming an income of $2,500, tax rate of 30 percent and an audit rate of 25% 
(Hypothetical Compliance at 25 Percent Audit) and an audit rate of zero percent (Hypothetical 
Compliance at Zero Percent Audit). However, participants did not earn money based on these 
decisions. The hypothetical and actual compliance measures represent the proportion of the 
income provided reported by the participants. 
Participants also responded to four case situations. Participants’ responses to these case 
scenarios were obtained on a Likert-type scale ranging from -3 to +3, with -3 labeled unlikely 
and +3 labeled likely that they would choose not to report their income in line with the decision 
of the character in each of the four cases. Since participants’ responses to all four case scenarios 
were highly correlated to each other and factor analysis (results not presented) suggested that all 
four loaded on to a single factor, these responses were combined to form one variable termed 
Response to Cases.   
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Finally, two measures of past evasion were also elicited from the participants. The first measure 
relates to participants’ compliance behavior in the previous year (Last Year), while the second 
measure related to participants’ compliance behavior in all past years (Past). These two measures 
refer to actual tax behavior – which we cannot verify independently. These measures were 
obtained using a binary scale with a “Yes” response coded as one and a “No” response coded as 
0, to questions on whether they had evaded tax in the previous year and in the past respectively. 
As would be expected, the mean of the response to the question relating to evasion in the past 
(0.179) is greater than the mean of the response to the question relating to evasion in the previous 
year (0.139). 
Sample Selection 
  Hill and Kabir (1996) report that participation in the underground economy and, by 
extension; tax evasion in Canada is especially high among low-income individuals (including 
those in school, unemployed, and receiving social assistance), youths and unmarried persons. In 
this context Jackson and Milliron (1986) observe that tax evasion studies should focus on groups 
of interest rather than try to obtain a diverse set of participants. Consequently, our study focuses 
on students recruited from a mid-size Canadian university. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics 
on demographic variables relating to our sample. Consistent with the fact that all of our 
participants are students, the mean age of our sample is 24.38. 65 of our 79 participants are 
undergraduates, the rest being MBA students. Finally, our sample is evenly matched in terms of 
gender with 40 (39) being female (male).
3 Fully, 96 percent of our participants had tax filing 
experience. While 41 participants were provided with an income of 5,000 Lira, 38 participants 
were provided with an income of 9,000 Lira. One individual did not provide personality related 
information and hypothetical compliance decision at the 25 percent audit rate; therefore, data  
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analysis was carried out using data provided by the other 78 participants.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
4.  Data Analysis and Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Correlations between intentions and different measures of compliance are provided in Table 4. 
Intent to Report Income is significantly correlated with all measures of compliance, while Intent 
to Overstate Deductions is significantly correlated only with the two measures of actual 
compliance and participants’ response to case scenarios. Interestingly, the correlations in Table 4 
indicate that past evasion is more strongly correlated to actual behavior in the laboratory than to 
either participants’ responses to case scenarios or to hypothetical evasion. These results suggest 
that compared to using case or hypothetical scenarios, using the methodology of experimental 
economics along with tax language may be a more appropriate method of obtaining data on why 
people comply. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
  Correlations in Table 4 indicate that while A Score, the measure of anti-establishment 
views, correlates negatively and significantly with the two measures of hypothetical compliance, 
P Score correlates positively and significantly with both measures of actual compliance. These 
results are very interesting indicating that while negative feelings about the government may 
impel individuals to reduce compliance in hypothetical situations they may not translate to an 
actual decrease in compliance, the latter being governed rather by the individual’s level of moral 
reasoning.  
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Of the TPB constructs, Subjective Norms correlates positively and significantly with 
Intent to Report Income and negatively and significantly with admission of non-compliance in 
prior years. Monetary Considerations correlates negatively and significantly with Intent to 
Report Income as well as the two measures of actual compliance. In contrast, the other attitudinal 
variables correlate significantly only with either the intent measures or hypothetical measures of 
compliance, and not with either measures of admission of evasion in the past or with actual 
compliance decisions in the laboratory. 
Description of the Regression Models 
Fully interactive models using the measures relating to intent, responses to cases, 
hypothetical compliance, actual compliance and the difference between the hypothetical and 
actual compliance were estimated. For each dependent variable, initially, step-wise regressions 
were estimated with variables of interest, including treatment variables, included as independent 
variables adopting cut-offs of 0.20 and 0.25 for including and excluding variables respectively 
(results not presented). Next, using the independent variables found to be significant for each 
model in the above procedure, fully interactive models were estimated. All interactions 
insignificant at or above the 0.25 level were eliminated with their sums of squares being pooled 
with the error term. Only the final models resulting from the above procedure have been 
presented in this paper. First, results from the fully interactive regression models using Intent to 
Report Income and Intent to Overstate Deductions as the dependent variable respectively are 
provided in Table 5.  
Insert Table 5 about here  
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Regression Models Relating to Intentions  
The Theory of Planned Behavior predicts that the attitudinal measures influence 
compliance decisions only thorough the intent measures.  Therefore, we first wanted to 
document the extent to which these attitudinal measures along with personality variables explain 
the variation in the intent measures. Table 5 provides results from the final fully interactive 
models relating to intentions as a function of attitudinal and personality variables. Both models 
in Table 5 are highly significant. However, while the Adjusted R Square for the model with 
Intent to Report Income is a healthy 58.1 percent, the corresponding figure for the model with 
Intent to Overstate Deductions is only 12.2 percent. These results indicate that the constructs 
suggested by the Theory of Planned Behavior are a better predictor of Intent to Report Income 
than of Intent to Overstate Deductions. The direction of influence of all the independent 
variables included in the two models respectively is as expected. Significantly, moral reasoning, 
as represented by the P Score, being absent from both models, does not appear to influence either 
of the two intent measures. Finally, the Adjusted R Square for the two models in Table 5 
indicates that the attitudinal measures, social norms, attitudes, and perceived behavioral control 
appear to be capable of explaining only partially. Further, as stated above, the TPB posits that the 
attitudinal variables influence behavior only via intentions. Therefore, these results in 
conjunction with the prediction of TPB suggest that if research resources are scarce experiments 
may be better of just collecting taxpayers’ intentions towards compliance rather than spending 
effort on collecting data on the attitudinal variables. The question of whether the attitudinal 
variables influence behavior directly as well as indirectly via intentions is explored further 
below.   
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Panel A of Table 6 provides results from two fully interactive models with the two 
measures of hypothetical compliance as dependent variables respectively. The adjusted R Square 
for the model with Hypothetical Compliance at the Zero Percent Audit (Hypothetical 
Compliance at the 25 Percent Audit) level is only 25.3 (20.6) percent. This result suggest that the 
constructs suggested by the Theory of Planned Behavior, intentions, subjective norms, attitudes 
and perception of behavioral control are capable of explaining only a minor portion of the 
variation in the hypothetical compliance decisions of our participants. Furthermore, and 
reflecting the correlation results presented in Table 3, only the Intent to Report measure appears 
to influence participants’ hypothetical compliance decisions. Significantly, the attitudinal 
variables, subjective norms and attitudes, do not seem to have a significant influence over and 
above the influence of the intent measure on participants’ hypothetical compliance. This finding 
supports the Theory of Planned Behavior which posits that individual’s social norms and 
attitudes influence their compliance decisions only through the intent constructs. Additionally, 
the Theory of Planned Behavior’s prediction that individuals’ perceived behavioral control not 
only influences their compliance decisions through their intentions but also directly is not 
supported. Coupled with our earlier findings in Table 5 that neither Penalties nor Third Party 
Reporting influences either of the two intent measures, the above results indicate that the 
perceived behavioral control construct of the Theory of Planned Behavior does not have a 
significant influence on either the intentions or hypothetical compliance decisions of the 
individuals. Individuals’ moral reasoning as represented by their P Score also appears to have no 
influence on their hypothetical decisions. Finally, there were no significant interactions between 
the included variables in either of the two models presented in Panel A, Table 6. 
Insert Table 6 about here  
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Panel B, Table 6 reports results from the final fully interactive models with the two 
measures of actual compliance respectively. Recall that these two measures of compliance were 
obtained using experimental economics techniques in the face of real monetary compensation. 
The adjusted R Square of the two models in Panel B, Table 6 is 42.4 and 48.2 percent 
respectively. Thus, the explanatory power of these models is much better compared to the 
models with hypothetical measures of compliance in Panel A, Table 6 or with case scenarios as 
in Table A.2 in the appendix. These results along with the fact that only actual measures of 
compliance correlate significantly with admissions of past evasion indicate that compared to 
traditional methods of using hypothetical or case scenarios in psychology based studies, use of 
experimental economics techniques with tax language can provide better insights on the tax 
compliance decisions of individuals. 
The results in Panel B, Table 6 indicate that Intent to Overstate Deductions is significant 
only in the model with compliance at the zero percent audit level as the dependent variable. 
Trying to defend fictitious expenses is more difficult than to defend concealed income in the case 
of an audit. Therefore, intent to overstate deductions can be expected to correlate with actual 
compliance decisions only when the risk of being audited is absent. Our results appear to support 
this contention. Interestingly, variables relating to the attitudes and perceived behavioral control 
constructs of the Theory of Planned Behavior appear to significantly influence our participants’ 
compliance decisions either individually or through interactions. In contrast, the Subjective 
Norms variable is not significant in both the models in Panel B, Table 6. These results indicate 
that both attitudes and perceived behavioral control not only influence our participants’ 
compliance decisions indirectly through the intent variables but also directly by themselves or 
though interactions. These findings are contrary to both the predictions of the Theory of Planned  
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Behavior and the findings in Panel A, Table 6 with hypothetical compliance decisions as the 
dependent variables. The results in Panel B, Table 6 suggest that compared to just including 
intentions, additionally including attitudes and perceived behavioral control related variables can 
increase the explanatory power of models trying to explain actual compliance decisions of 
individuals.  Unlike in Panel A, Table 6, the P Score (A Score) is highly significant (not 
significant) in both models in Panel B, Table 6. This reiterates the finding in Table 4 that when it 
comes to actual compliance decisions our participants appear to be more influenced by their level 
of moral reasoning than by any negative feelings towards the government. Significantly, P score 
is by far the most significant variable in both models. This result, along with the significance of 
the attitudinal variables indicates that ignoring these variables and focusing on economic 
variables alone while examining individuals’ tax compliance decisions will provide a very 
limited understanding of factors affecting such behavior. This conclusion is reiterated by the 
findings in Panel C, Table 6 using repeated data that moral reasoning is by far the most 
influential variable in that model even compared to audit rate. Finally, our results in Panel B, 
Table 6 indicate that for obtaining a proper understanding of how the independent variables 
influence individuals’ compliance decisions not only should we consider their main effects but 
also their interactions. In our models, not only did we find some two-way interactions to be 
significant, we also found some three-way interactions to be significant as well. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
  Finally, in Table 7 we provide the results of t-tests between the different estimated mean 
compliance measures obtained using the various models estimated above. The results from these 
t-tests indicate that hypothetical compliance and actual compliance decisions are not the same. 
The actual compliance decisions in face of an increase in the likelihood of an audit from zero to  
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twenty-five percent is consistent with the underlying theory, while the hypothetical compliance 
decisions are not. 
  If participants in these tax compliance environments were attempting to maximize their 
expected incomes, the payoff function could be represented as 
E(I) = I - tR - p(t (I - R) 2.5) 
where E(I) is expected income, I is actual income, t is the tax rate, R is reported income, p is the 
probability of a tax audit and 2.5 is the extra tax plus the penalty paid if there is an audit (the 
assumption is that all audits are successful in exposing lack of compliance if it actually 
occurred). In this environment, the optimal value of R is zero as long as p is less than forty 
percent. With p equal to forty percent, the individual would be indifferent between revealing her 
true income and revealing nothing, if she is maximizing expected income. If p exceeds forty 
percent, the individual will fully reveal her income. In this environment, increasing the audit rate 
from any value less than forty percent to any other value less than forty percent will have no 
effect on what the expected utility maximizing individual will do. 
  Individuals may choose to comply or not comply for reasons other than their 
maximization of expected income. These reasons may be based on inherent values or attitudes. 
Accordingly, individuals may choose to fully or partially comply with tax rules even though 
these may be in conflict with the maximization of their expected income. It is unlikely that 
changing the audit rate will affect these values. Therefore, we would expect a change in the audit 
rate to have no effect on compliance of individuals in either the hypothetical environment of the 
environment with financial incentives introduced in this paper.  
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  The data reported in Table 7 indicate that in the absence of an audit, the estimated mean 
compliance rate is thirty-eight percent of the income endowment in the hypothetical compliance 
environment and fifty-seven percent in the actual compliance environment. These are 
significantly different. When there is no money at stake and there is no audit, participants in 
these environments report less of their income than when money is at stake. There is no obvious 
explanation for this change in compliance. 
  In both environments, the estimate of compliance increases when the likelihood of an 
audit increases from zero to twenty-five percent. The difference between compliance of seventy-
six percent for the hypothetical compliance and sixty-three percent for the actual compliance 
results in a reduction in the gap between the compliance rates, but the difference is still 
significant. 
  A more interesting observation is that the increase in actual compliance from fifty-seven 
percent to sixty-three percent is not statistically significant, while the increase in hypothetical 
compliance from thirty-eight to seventy-six percent is highly significant. The impact on 
compliance for the participants in the environment with real financial incentives when audit rates 
are increased is more consistent with the underlying theory than is the impact on compliance in 
the environment which asks for hypothetical decisions. This result provides evidence of the 
desirability of decision environments which are based on salient and dominant rewards over 
those which posit hypothetical decisions to hypothetical questions to study the decision-making 
behavior of individuals who are expected to make decisions in situations with salient and 
dominant rewards.  
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5. Concluding  Remarks 
  Extent experimental research in tax compliance has either followed the economic 
paradigm or the psychology paradigm. Experimental economics studies seldom consider 
personality or attitudinal factors while examining tax compliance in the laboratory. Further, they 
avoid tax related language in the instructions to the participants to maintain control in the 
laboratory. However, these studies elicit individuals’ repeated decisions in the face of real 
monetary incentives, thus participants’ decisions have real economic consequences to them. In 
contrast, psychology studies do place heavy emphasis on understanding how individuals’ 
personality and attitudinal variables influence their intentions regarding compliance and thereon 
to the tax compliance decisions. Further, they use tax related language in the instructions to the 
participants to elicit behavior reflecting their real compliance decisions. However, these studies 
refrain from providing monetary incentives tied to decisions to the participants; thus, 
participants’ decisions have no economic consequences to them. It appears that a better 
understanding of individuals’ tax compliance decisions can be achieved by judiciously 
combining experimental economics and experimental psychology techniques when trying to 
understand tax compliance in the laboratory. 
Our study attempts to achieve two broad objectives. First, we examine whether 
individuals’ tax compliance decisions in the face of real monetary incentives can be better 
explained by a model that not only includes economic variables but also attitudinal and 
personality related variables. Second, we compare measures of compliance such as hypothetical 
compliance decisions, and responses to case scenarios, traditionally used in experimental 
psychology studies on tax compliance to actual compliance decisions in the laboratory to try and 
see which might be a better reflection of individuals’ actual tax compliance decisions.  
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Our study makes several important contributions. First, it demonstrates that personality 
and attitudinal variables are important determinants of individuals’ actual compliance decisions 
in the laboratory. In fact, our study indicates that individuals’ moral reasoning may be a very 
important determinant of their compliance. This finding may also explain why tax compliance in 
the United States and Canada is relatively very high despite the very low audit rates in force in 
both countries. Our finding indicates that restricting focus on economic based variables like audit 
rates, penalties etc., may provide only a partial picture of the determinants of individuals’ tax 
compliance decisions. 
Second, our study suggests that hypothetical decisions in the laboratory are not the same 
as actual decisions in the laboratory. Specifically, both measures of hypothetical compliance 
captured by us, one at zero percent audit rate and the other at 25 percent audit rate are 
significantly different from their actual compliance counterparts. Further, hypothetical decisions 
appear to be far more sensitive to changes in audit rate when compared to actual decisions in the 
laboratory. The changes in actual compliance decisions in the laboratory in response to 
parameter changes are more closely related to the underlying economic theory than are the 
changes in hypothetical compliance decisions. 
Third, our results indicate that actual compliance decisions in the laboratory, compared to 
hypothetical compliance decisions, or responses to case scenarios, may be better reflections of 
individuals’ tax compliance decisions in real life. We find that actual compliance decisions in the 
laboratory are more significantly correlated with individuals’ admissions of evasion in the past 
than the other measures of compliance.   
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Finally, we find that when it comes to actual compliance decisions in the laboratory, 
individuals’ attitudinal variables influence their compliance decisions not only indirectly via 
their intentions but also directly by themselves. Thus, devoting resources to obtaining attitudinal 
data and intent measures and conducting an evaluation of the impact on taxpayer compliance to 
changes in policy variables (such as audit rates or penalties) in a controlled laboratory 
environment with salient and dominant (monetary) rewards, may provide improved impact 




1 Torgler (2002) provides a very good review of this literature. 
 





3 There is no difference in compliance rates between men and women in any dimension (hypothetical or 
actual, audit rate of zero or twenty five). Specifically, while gender is insignificant in models with hypothetical 
compliance measures as well as actual compliance at zero percent audit as the dependent variable respectively, it is 
marginally significant with a p value of 0.07 percent in the model with actual compliance at 25 percent audit. 
However, it is not significant when other variables of interest are included in that model. Therefore, gender has been 
ignored in further data analysis. REFERENCES 
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Subjective Norms  0.863* 
Approval of Friend 
Approval of Tax Preparer 
Approval of Peers 
Approval of Spouse 
Approval of Employer 
Approval of Family 





Duties of a Citizen  0.849* 
Fulfilling of one’s moral and ethical obligations 
Funding the government 
Fulfilling duties of citizen 
Recognition of good ethics by community 
The presence of records (e.g. computer records or receipts) 
 






Advantage of the System  0.659* 
Bragging rights 
Knowledge of the income tax system 
Feeling of beating the system 
Effort required to prepare tax return 
  Paying extra earnings by being compliant
c 
Theory of Planned Behavior Construct – Perceived Behavioral Control 
 
Penalties  0.374* 
Possibility of penalties (e.g. fines or jail time) 
Making my friends feel awkward 
Third Party Reporting  Third-party reporting (e.g. employers or banks) 






* Associated Alpha score, a measure of reliability which is based on the average inter-item correlation 
within each factor. 
a The six factors, Subjective Norms, Duties of a Citizen, Monetary Considerations, Advantage of the 
System, Penalties and Third Party Reporting were identified using factor analysis and a cut-off of one for 
related eigen values and using 23 indicators. Only 20 of these 23 indicators loaded on the six factors so 
identified. 
b The indicators represent the product of two related measures elicited using seven-point Likert scales 
ranging from -3 to +3. The first was designed to elicit how much the participants  valued each of the 
beliefs (i.e. how important the item or person was to their tax reporting decision). The second was 
designed to elicit their rating of the expectancy (of encouraging / discouraging underreporting) of each 
belief. 
c Indicators that did not load on to any of the six factors. 
  
  28
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Attitude, Intentions, Personality Variables, and Different Measures of 
Compliance 
Variable n  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation 
Attitudes
a 
Subjective Norms  78  -2.129  2.158  0.000  1.000 
Duties of a Citizen  78  -1.932  3.223  0.000  1.000 
Monetary Considerations  78  -2.165  2.686  0.000  1.000 
Advantage of the System  78  -1.828  3.453  0.000  1.000 
Penalties 78  -2.525  3.937  0.000  1.000 
Third Party Reporting  78  -3.104  3.133  0.000  1.000 
Intentions
b 
Intent to Report Income  79  -2.852  1.267  0.000  1.000 
Intent to Overstate Deductions  79  -3.000  3.000  -0.392  1.996 
Personality Variables
c 
A Score  79  0.000  11.000  3.096  2.811 
P Score  79  10.000  66.700  34.980  13.682 
Different Measures of Compliance 
Hypothetical Compliance at 0% Audit
d 79  0.000  1.000  0.566  0.406 
Hypothetical Compliance at 25% Audit
d 78  0.000  1.000 0.763  0.342 
Average Actual Compliance at 0% Audit
e 79  0.000  1.000  0.551  0.373 
Average Actual Compliance at 25% Audit
e 79  0.000  1.000  0.617  0.366 
Response to Cases
f 79  -2.603  1.380  0.000  1.000 
Non-compliance in Previous Year
g 79  0.000  1.000  0.139  0.348 
Non-compliance in the Past
g 78  0.000  1.000  0.179  0.386 
Notes: 
a Identified using factor analysis as elaborated in the notes to Table 1 above. 
b Intent to Report Income identified as lone factor on which all four indicators of intent to report load using factor 
analysis and cut-off of one for eigen values. Intent to Overstate Deductions represents the raw scores relating to the 
lone measure relating to intent to overstate deductions obtained from participants. The four measures of intent to 
report income as well as the lone measure of intent to overstate deductions were elicited using a Likert-type scale 
ranging from -3 to +3, with -3 labelled unlikely and +3 labelled likely that they would report their income or 
overstate deductions.  
c Obtained from the DIT of Rest (1987). 
d The two measures of hypothetical compliance were obtained assuming an income of $2,500, tax rate of 30 percent 
and an audit rate of 25% and 0 percent respectively. Participants did not earn money based on these decisions. 
e The two measures of actual compliance represent average compliance over five rounds under audit rate of 25 
percent and 0 percent respectively. While some participants were given an income of 5,000 Lira others were given 
an income of 9,000 Lira. Participants provided with 5,000 Lira had to pay taxes at 10 percent, while participants at 
the 9,000 Lira level had to pay taxes at 50 percent. 
f Represents the lone factor identified using factor analysis and a cut-off of one for related eigen values and 
participants responses to four case situations. Participants’ responses to these case scenarios were obtained on a 
Likert-type scale ranging from -3 to +3, with -3 labelled unlikely and +3 labelled likely that they would choose not 
to report their income in line with the decision of the character in each of the four cases. 
g These two measures refer to actual tax behavior – which we cannot verify independently. These measures were 
obtained using a binary scale with a “Yes” response coded as one and a “No” response coded as 0, to questions on 
whether they had evaded tax in the previous year and in the past respectively. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on Demographic Variables (N=79) 














0% Audit  
Actual 
25% Audit  
Age  Mean 24.38 yrs (range 19 to 54)  79        
Female 40  0.610  0.811  0.597  0.690   
Gender  Male 39  0.521  0.716  0.503  0.542 
Undergraduate 65  0.545 0.746  0.553  0.646   
Group  MBA 14  0.664 0.844  0.538  0.479 
Never Filed  3  0.200 0.433  0.448  0.389 
1-2 Years  33  0.606 0.738  0.626  0.717 
3-4 Years  25  0.547 0.792  0.529  0.626 


















Hyp. at 25% 
Audit 
Actual at 0% 
Audit 
Actual at 
25% Audit  Last Year  Past 
Response to 
Cases 
Intent to Comply  -0.364***  0.437***  0.330***  0.347***  0.286**  -0.391*** -0.362*** -0.378*** 
Intent to Evade    -0.181  -0.143  -0.304***  -0.223**  0.024 0.180 0.276** 
Hyp. At  0% Audit      0.634***  0.266** 0.258** -0.057  -0.089  -0.192* 
Hyp. at 25% Audit        0.015 0.061 0.022  -0.045  0.013 
Actual at 0% Audit         0.736***  -0.368***  -0.221*  -0.288*** 
Actual at 25% Audit           -0.301***  -0.226**  -0.232** 
Last Year             0.770***  0.218* 
Past               0.123 
 
Panel B: Parametric Correlations between Intentions, Different Measures of Compliance and Attitudes towards Compliance (N=78) 
 
Subjective 
Norms  Citizen Money 
Adv. 
of 
System  Penalty 
Third 
Party  A Score  P Score 
Intent to Comply  0.391***  0.388***  -0.433***  -0.240**  -0.105  0.039 -0.116 0.178 
Intent to Evade  0.009 -0.085  0.252**  0.265**  -0.099  -0.149  -0.024  -0.111 
Hyp. At 0% Audit  0.073 0.226**  -0.178 -0.095  -0.108  0.050  -0.316***  0.142 
Hyp. at 25% Audit  0.032 0.080  -0.004 -0.243**  -0.170  0.197*  -0.328***  0.121 
Actual at 0% Audit  0.022  0.115  -0.372***  -0.003 0.067  -0.026 0.021  0.556*** 
Actual at 25% Audit  0.038  0.171  -0.358***  0.046 -0.114  0.149 0.046  0.577*** 
Last Year  -0.366***  -0.003  0.133  -0.051  0.070  0.044 -0.092 -0.211* 
Past  -0.352***  -0.180  0.103  0.028 0.047  -0.069  -0.164 -0.171 
Response to Cases  -0.112  -0.114  0.411***  -0.023 0.135  -0.009 0.112  -0.215* 
Subjective Norms    0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.072  -0.015 
Citizen      0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.087  0.041 
Money        0.000 0.000  0.000 0.032  -0.329*** 
Adv. of System         0.000  0.000  0.149  -0.124 
Penalty           0.000  0.211*  -0.068 
Third Party             -0.014  -0.005 
A Score               -0.026 
Notes: 
Table 1 and Table 2 provide further details about the various variables included in this table.  
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Table 5 
OLS Results from Full Model Relating to Intentions (N=78) 
Variable B 
Std. 
Error t  Sig. B 
Std. 
Error t  Sig. 
  Dependent Variable 
  Intention to Report Income  Intention to Overstate Deds. 
Intercept  0.164 0.111 1.477  0.144  -0.410  0.213  -1.931  0.057
Monetary Considerations (A)  -0.447  0.082 -5.452  0.000  0.505 0.214  2.362  0.021
Advantage of System (B)  -0.054  0.147  -0.367  0.715  0.531  0.214  2.482  0.015
Subjective Norms (C)  0.376  0.080  4.688  0.000         
Duties of a Citizen (D)  0.431  0.076  5.704  0.000         
A Score (E)  -0.044  0.027  -1.605  0.113         
Third Party Reporting (F)          -0.299  0.214  -1.398  0.166
A x C  0.141  0.080  1.759  0.083         
B x D  0.159  0.088  1.808  0.075         
B x E  -0.050  0.037  -1.360  0.178         
C x D  -0.177  0.083  -2.142  0.036         
Adjusted R Squired  0.581  0.122 
Model F (Significance)   12.847 (0.000)  4.564 (0.005) 
Notes: 
Table 1 and Table 2 provide further details about the various variables included in this table.  
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Table 6 
Panel A: OLS Results from Fully Model Relating to Hypothetical Compliance (N=78) 
 
Variable  B 
Std. 
Error t  Sig.  B 
Std. 
Error t  Sig. 
 Dependent  Variable 
  Hyp. Comp. at 0 % Audit  Hyp. Comp. at 25% Audit 
Included Variables 
Intercept  0.648 0.066 9.801 0.000 0.871 0.052 16.822  0.000 
Intention to Report 
Income  0.176 0.041 4.265 0.000 0.122 0.039 3.153 0.002 
A  Score  -0.035 0.015  -2.399 0.019  -0.035 0.012  -2.815 0.006 
Undergrads  -0.159 0.108  -1.472 0.145      
Third  Party  Reporting      0.061  0.035  1.761  0.082 
Monetary  Considerations      0.055  0.039  1.425  0.158 
Adjusted R Squired  0.253  0.206 
Model F (Significance)   9.695 (0.000)  5.995 (0.000) 
 




Error t Sig.  B 
Std. 
Error t  Sig. 
  Dependent Variable 
  Comp. at 0% Audit Rate  Comp. at 25% Audit Rate 
Intercept  -0.010 0.094  -0.103 0.918  -0.035 0.117  -0.300 0.765 
P Score (A)  0.016  0.003  6.280  0.000  0.017  0.003  6.758  0.000 
Intent. To Report Income (B)  0.297  0.093  3.191  0.002  0.278  0.105  2.657  0.010 
Advantage of System (C)  0.065  0.034  1.929  0.058  0.165  0.094  1.746  0.086 
Intent. to Overstate Deds. (D)  -0.041  0.018  -2.319  0.023         
Third Party Reporting (E)          0.218  0.159  1.367  0.177 
Undergraduates  (F)        0.073  0.086  0.854  0.396 
A  x  B  -0.007 0.003  -2.501 0.015  -0.005 0.003  -1.764 0.083 
E x F          0.282  0.102  2.774  0.007 
A x C          -0.002  0.003  -0.594  0.555 
A x E          -0.011  0.004  -2.779  0.007 
B x C          -0.030  0.033  -0.932  0.355 
B x E          -0.291  0.163  -1.780  0.080 
C x E          0.160  0.126  1.265  0.211 
A x B x E          0.007  0.005  1.415  0.162 
A x C x E          -0.006  0.004  -1.660  0.102 
B x C x E          0.143  0.052  2.769  0.007 
Adjusted R Squired  0.424  0.482 
Model F (Significance)   12.343 (0.000)  5.777 (0.000) 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Panel C: OLS Results from Full Model Relating to Actual Compliance at 25 Percent Audit 




Error t Sig.  B 
Std. 
Error t  Sig. 
  Dependent Variable 
  Hypothetical Decisions  Actual Decisions 
Included Variables 
Intercept  1.121 0.093  12.008 0.000 0.040 0.071 0.558 0.578 
Zero % Audit (A)  -0.195  0.051  -3.833  0.000 -0.065  0.045  -1.437  0.153 
Undergraduates  (B)  -0.287  0.095  -3.006  0.003     
Intent to Report Income (C)  0.321  0.097  3.300  0.001 0.205  0.066  3.122  0.002 
A Score (D)  -0.031  0.010  -3.241  0.001        
Third Party (E)  0.041  0.087  0.470  0.639        
Subjective Norms (F)  -0.040  0.031  -1.289  0.200        
P Score (G)          0.016  0.002  8.812  0.000 
Intent to Overstate 
Deductions (H)          -0.026  0.013  -2.051  0.042 
Advantage of System (I)          0.069 0.024 2.884 0.005 
A x C  0.063  0.051  1.246  0.215        
B x C  -0.210  0.093  -2.247  0.026        
B x E  -0.045  0.097  -0.463  0.644        
C x E  -0.317  0.148  -2.148  0.033        
C x F  0.005  0.036  0.145  0.885        
E x F  -0.071  0.038  -1.872  0.063        
C x G          -0.004  0.002  -2.187  0.030 
C x H          -0.027  0.013  -2.117  0.036 
B x C x E  0.344  0.146  2.355  0.020        
B x E x F  0.093  0.045  2.054  0.042        
Adjusted R Squired  0.330  0.420 
Model F (Significance)   6.443 (0.000)  17.061 (0.000) 
Notes: 
Table 1 and Table 2 provide further details about the various variables included in this table.  
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Table 7 
Two-tailed T-tests on Differences between Mean Hypothetical and Actual Compliance 
Amounts at 25 % and 0 % Audit Rate Respectively (N=78) 









SE t  value 
Hypothetical 
Compliance  (A)  0.763  0.035  0.381  0.052 0.382 0.063  6.086***
Actual Compliance 
(B)  0.633  0.042  0.566  0.033 0.067 0.053  1.268 
Difference (A-B)    0.130    -0.185       
Pooled SE    0.054    0.062       
t value    2.406**   -3.001***       
Notes: 
Mean hypothetical and actual compliance amounts represent estimated values obtained using 
model results in Table 6. 
Table 2 provides further details about the various variables included in this table.  
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Table A.1 




Duties of a 
Citizen 







App. Of Employer  0.71 0.26  -0.12  0.00  -0.26  -0.03 
App. Of Family  0.64 0.35  -0.42  0.04  0.02 -0.10 
App. Of Friend  0.80 0.13  -0.12  -0.12 -0.05  -0.14 
App. Of Spouse  0.66 0.27  -0.27  -0.06 0.11 -0.20 
App. Of Tax Preparer  0.79 -0.04  0.09  -0.17 0.06 0.30 
App. Of Peers  0.73 0.16  0.13  0.20  -0.01  0.21 
Recog. of Ethics  0.22  0.77 -0.07  -0.22  -0.13  0.08 
Fulfilment of Obligations  0.42  0.54 -0.41  -0.09  -0.30  0.09 
Duties of Citizen  0.22  0.71 -0.19  -0.08  0.14  0.18 
Presence of Records  0.12  0.87 0.00  -0.17  -0.05  0.00 
Funding Government  0.31  0.54 -0.21  0.14  -0.06  -0.01 
Effort to Prepare Return  -0.10  -0.17  0.65 0.27  -0.12  -0.06 
Bragging Rights  0.19  0.00  0.57 -0.16  -0.20  -0.33 
Knowledge of System  -0.19  0.00  0.75 -0.06  0.18  -0.01 
Feeling of Beating Sys.  -0.06  -0.39  0.66 0.19  0.00  0.08 
Cash 0.16  -0.53  0.23  0.57 -0.16  0.00 
Refund -0.06  -0.29  0.28  0.71 -0.08  -0.25 
Possibility of Penalties  0.18  0.09  -0.22  -0.21  0.74 0.01 
Making Friends Awk.  -0.24  -0.16  0.17  0.07  0.76 -0.02 
Third-party reporting  0.13  0.25  -0.03  0.00  0.04  0.76 
Feeling Guilty  0.38  0.33  0.17  0.16  0.19  -0.52 
Paying Extra Taxes  0.19  0.17  0.00  -0.72  -0.06  0.04 
Possibility of Tax Audit  0.17  0.23  -0.12  0.53  -0.09  0.27  
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Table A.1 (Continued) 




Duties of a 
Citizen 







App. Of Family  0.80 0.13  -0.05  -0.08 -0.10  -0.05 
App. Of Tax Preparer  0.75 -0.02  0.12  -0.09 0.03 0.38 
App. Of Employer  0.73 0.25  -0.04  -0.02 -0.29  -0.03 
App. Of Spouse  0.71 0.27  -0.18  -0.15 0.06 -0.16 
App. Of Family  0.68 0.36  -0.37  -0.06 -0.01  -0.12 
App. Of Peers  0.67 0.19  0.05  0.26  0.00 0.38 
Fulfilment of Obligations  0.41  0.51 -0.36  -0.17  -0.37  0.13 
Funding Government  0.31  0.52 -0.25  0.07  -0.09  0.08 
Duties of Citizen  0.24  0.67 -0.16  -0.23  0.10  0.15 
Recog. of Ethics  0.22  0.83 -0.04  -0.15  -0.10  0.05 
Presence of Records  0.13  0.85 0.06  -0.25  -0.10  0.03 
Bragging Rights  0.21  -0.10  0.72 -0.15  -0.29  -0.24 
Feeling of Beating Sys.  -0.10  -0.31  0.56 0.43  0.14  0.05 
Effort to Prepare Return  -0.16  -0.17  0.53 0.44  -0.07  0.13 
Knowledge of System  -0.21  0.06  0.73 0.14  0.30  -0.04 
Cash 0.14  -0.47  0.09  0.68 -0.04  0.02 
Refund -0.06  -0.21  0.07  0.84 0.08  -0.19 
Possibility of Penalties  0.24  -0.06  -0.12  -0.55  0.55 0.07 
Making Friends Awk.  -0.20  -0.11  0.09  0.04  0.84 -0.08 
Third-party reporting  0.03  0.16  -0.11  -0.14  -0.06  0.86 
Notes: 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation method used is Varimax with Kaiser  
Normalization. 








Error t  Sig. 
  Dependent Variable: Responses to Cases 
Intercept 0.009  0.102  0.093  0.926 
Monetary Considerations  0.302  0.114  2.662  0.009 
Intent. to Report Income  -0.254  0.113  -2.249  0.027 
Adjusted R Squired  0.201 
Model F (Significance)   10.664 (0.000) 
Notes: 
Table 1 and Table 2 provide further details about the various variables included in this table. 